An Argument Against Compatibilist/Calvinistic "Freedom"

"Compatibilism" basically says that both determinism and moral responsibility are compatible. "Yes, it’s true that everything is basically like dominoes--one falls just because the previous one fell on it and it couldn’t have done otherwise. However, that doesn’t mean that we can’t say you aren’t morally responsible for what you do. In fact, you are morally responsible for what you do. Even though everything is caused and fixed-by-causes (including your actions), your actions can still be right and wrong and thus blameworthy or praiseworthy."

How is it that my actions are still morally significant? What you’re going to get are answers that have to do with your desires and your "freedom" to do what you want. You may not have been able to do any different, but you did do what you wanted to do. You were not coerced into doing it. You did act on your own desires. (But, of course, you couldn’t have desired any differently--those are as caused and determined as anything else.)

Calvinists don’t tell precisely the same story, but in telling the story they do tell, they often commit themselves to these same basic ideas about freedom and responsibility. Theologically, they’re more worried about saying that certain people are not able to want or to perform morally good actions. Nevertheless, this commits them to an account of how human freedom and responsibility works. They can’t accept that a person can only be blamed for doing a bad thing if that person had the ability to have done a good thing instead. Why? Because they’re committed theologically to the idea that lost people *cannot* do anything good, but that lost people are nevertheless blameworthy for their sins.
Okay, that’s all set up and intro. And please consider that i broad-brushed it a little. There are actually some compatibilist-philosophers who might try to give a different account of how it all works. and i know that there are a handful of Calvinists who actually hold different views about how freedom works. But take these as trends.

So imagine for a moment that i build a tiny machine. This little machine was designed to be attached to someone’s head, and at the touch of a remote-button, it will send signals to that person’s brain which will cancel out that person’s desires and substitute my desires so the person carries out my desires. Suppose i attach it to Mr. Smeed’s head. So now every time i push my remote button, Mr. Smeed will carry out an action i desire. Suppose i really hate Mr. Togglesworth’s guts. In fact, i want to punch him in the face. But instead of doing it myself, i push my remote button, that desire gets sent to Mr. Smeed’s brain, and then Mr. Smeed walks over to Mr. Togglesworth and punches him in the face.

Some of you reading may think it’s perfectly okay to sucker punch people (i hope that’s not true of you though), but just assume with me for the moment that this is a bad, wrong thing to do. The important question is this: Do you think Mr. Smeed is blameworthy for punching Mr. Togglesworth? i’d say absolutely not--he’s not to blame at all. Some of you might disagree, and if you do, i’d like to know why. But i think this is a clear case of coercion, and even on the compatibilist’s/Calvinist’s account of freedom, coercion exempts one from responsibility.

Now suppose i built another machine. This machine is slightly different. Instead of sending *my* desires into the brain and will of another person, what this machine does is allow me to simply input or create desires in that person’s brain. So again i run through the same scenario--i put the machine on Smeed’s head, i input into the machine the desire to punch Togglesworth, and thus Smeed punches Togglesworth. Is Smeed blameworthy for punching Togglesworth? I’d still say absolutely not. This doesn’t seem to me to be any less a case of coercion than the last one. You might disagree, and if you do, i’d like to know why. But if it’s coercion at all, then Smeed is not to blame even if compatibilists are right about freedom and responsibility!

One last hypothetical and then i’ll make my case. Suppose there was no machine at all. Suppose that i simply hypnotized Smeed. i hypnotized him and instructed him to punch Togglesworth. i woke him, Smeed immediately got up, found Togglesworth, and punched him. Is Smeed blameworthy for punching Togglesworth? I’d still say it’s obvious that he’s not. Hypnotic suggestion still seems to me like clear coercion.

If you’re on the fence about whether or not these would definitely be coercion, let me just ask, if i put the first machine on your head, and you killed someone due to my machine-input desire, and if i put the second machine on your head, and you killed a second person due to me inputting that desire into your head, and then if i hypnotized you and you killed a third person due to my hypnotic suggestion--if all that were true, would you think it was fair for *you* to be sentenced to death or prison-for-life for those killings? i seriously doubt anyone would consider that fair. But if you do, comment and tell me why. But i’m going to press on under the assumption that it sounds very reasonable that Smeed really wasn’t blameworthy for any of the punching he did.

Here’s my basic argument: I don’t see how compatibilism or Calvinism significantly differs from any of the above three hypothetical situations. In the above three situations, it seems entirely plausible that Smeed was not morally responsible for his actions. Unless a compatibilist or a Calvinist can show that people’s desires originate in a way that is significantly different than any of the three ways suggested above, then all they’ve said is that *all* actions are coerced. If all actions are coerced, then no one is morally responsible for their actions.

The Calvinist is basically going to say either that my desires are determined by God, or that my desires are determined by my spiritual ancestory. So God has a "machine" (His miraculous power) that makes me want to either do good or bad? So Adam had a "machine" (passing on his spiritual genes by procreating) which made me want to sin? How is that not coercion?

The compatibilist might have an account like biological determinism. i want such-and-such because it was in my DNA or my genes to want it. But i don’t see how that’s any different than a Calvinist’s story about Adam. Basically its saying that since my grandfather wanted to be a jerk, i will also want that--my grandfather inputted desires into me.

The compatibilist might also say that my desires are determined by my environment or my upbringing. In either case, i still have someone outside me inputting desires into me that i act on.

Again, i don’t see how a Calvinist or a compatibilist is going to tell me where desires come from without telling me something so close in character to one of the Smeed/Togglesworth scenarios that it amounts to coercion. If it amounts to coercion, then a Calvinist or a compatibilist will either have to say that no one is morally responsible for their actions due to coercion, or that their accounts of morally responsible actions are false.

A Question (or two) For The Anihilationist & The Christian Materialist

For The Annihilationist: If "hell" is nothing more than the passing out of existence of the wicked, then why is it at all significant to point out the duration (which is identified as unending) of fires and worms (Mark 9:43, 48)? What difference would it make to someone who is hellbound whether fires and worms lasted forever or only for the instant it took for them to pass into non-existence?

For The Christian Materialist: Precisely what part of you can be destroyed by God in hell that cannot be destroyed by those whom we shouldn't fear (Matthew 10:28)?

Is It Obvious That I Have A Ghost Inside Me?

Does being a Christian force me to think there's more to me than just physical parts? Does having Christian intuitions mean i think there just has to be some ghost floating around in my body? -- a "soul"?

i want to be very careful about this word "soul" because the Bible does use it. But it seems that many Christians take for granted that there are hard and fast categories like "physical" and "non-physical" or "material" and "immaterial," and there seems to be strong intuitions among Christian people that you've got to have some immaterial or non-physical part in human beings in order to account for our experiences in the physical world.

And don't those seems like good intuitions? When we hear about things like near-death experiences, don't they motivate us to say there's more to people than mere atoms and molecules? When we think about making moral decisions or creation breath-taking works of art, aren't we moved to say that people aren't merely cells and organs? When you think of your love for your children or spouse, does it sound right to say that such love is nothing more than some part of the brain in your skull sending electrical pulses to a different part of the brain in your skull? Does it sound right to say that love or hope reduces to just my body squirting more of some chemical into my brain juices? --like excreting one chemical makes me hopeful just like excreting another chemical makes me not colorblind? The point isn't figuring out how it works, but that many (maybe most) Christian people feel a strong urge to say that things like hope or making art or love cannot be merely physical things. In fact, such things are taken as proof that humans have to be more than just bodies.

i tend to have those same intuitions, but i just want to take time to challenge them. So...why not? Why can't humans be completely physical creatures? Why is it unthinkable that maybe love is just certain juices in my brain? Why can't making choices be nothing more than just certain tiny electrical shocks across tiny twigs in my brain? If hope was just certain chemicals at a certain level in my skull and nothing more, what would that change? Would the experience of love be any less meaningful or real if it were completely reduce-able to physical stuff? Would it mean any less to you if some one told you they loved you?

Couldn't God have made it this way? Is God not powerful enough to create a physical world that is so amazing that microscopic elements like synapses and electrical pulses together are able to make up or create love or hope? Why should we think that the physical world just can't possibly be enough to make up or account for something like love or consciousness?

Please don't misunderstand me--i'm not trying to claim that the Bible teaches we have no "soul." i haven't made any claim about what the Bible does or doesn't teach. i'm calling into question our intuitions -- our strong urges that drive us to say that it obviously must be a certain way or just can't possibly be another way. Is it so obvious?

But in addition, i would like to raise this question about what the Bible teaches: Does what the Bible says about humans and "souls" force me to think that there must be a physical part of me and a distinct non-physical part of me? Does what the Bible says about things like "souls" force me to think that i'm really a ghost driving a biological machine? i don't want to offer any sort of an answer yet; i'm hoping someone will offer some ideas.

Slavery to Sin Part 2

Slavery to Sin, to me, sounds as though there are conditions brought on us by sin which we are unable to reverse. In view of my recent readings about the resurrection, physical death is among them. Christ releases me from that slavery because i will be raised from the dead. But there has to be more components to this enslavement, because i can enjoy partial redemption from sin in the here and now. What exactly am i being freed from? Like i said before, growing up it seemed like slavery to sin was packaged as little more than it being really hard to stop sinning--that it's just such a habit to sin that it's very difficult to quit. That may still be true, but i have to repeat, it seems a very weak explanation of "slavery to sin."

Christ is supposed to be my Savior--the One who redeems me from sin. But let's be honest, even a Buddhist can bring his anger under control; even a Wiccan can make the hard choices to overturn her alcoholism; even an atheist can practice the self-denial necessary to stop cheating on his wife. So if slavery to sin is just the tremendous difficulty involved in giving it up, then how is Christ my redeemer from sin when it seems apparent i could've accomplished much of this "on my own"?

It is this point that makes the "difficult-habit-to-break" explanation of slavery to sin very, very unsatisfying to me. So what is it? Exactly what is it that Christ frees me from? In exactly what senses does sin "own" me such that i need Christ to buy me back? i would really love to consider your thoughts.